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John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand opens in St James Park, on a warm summer’s 
morning, with the teenage Mill striding to his office in Leadenhall Street in the 
financial heart of the City of London. Suddenly, Mill’s attention is caught by a small 
bundle abandoned beneath an oak tree. Curious, Mill kneels down beside it and 
unwraps the layers of soiled blankets only to discover a dead, newborn baby. This 
grisly experience remained etched in Mill’s mind for the duration of his life and was 
perhaps formative in shaping his views on the twin rights of life and liberty. 
Britain then stood poised in the vanguard of economic industrialisation and 
opportunity, yet the lot of the working classes often remained quite harsh. With 
grinding poverty being the accepted norm for so many ordinary Britons, it was not 
uncommon for poor families, unable to fend for themselves, to abandon their 
children. The whole incident had so moved Mill that he decided to take it upon 
himself to bring about social change. Along with a friend, he toured the East End of 
London distributing pamphlets informing working class people about 
contraception, birth control and family planning issues. He was soon arrested for 
the circulation of obscene materials and duly appeared before a Bow Street 
Magistrate. Mill spent a couple of days behind bars, the only occasion in his life 
where he was deprived of his personal freedom. His immediate family and close 
friends fretted about the possible damage the arrest might cause to his future 
reputation. Many years later this ‘Bow Street’ incident induced William Gladstone 
to refuse to participate in a memorial for Mill. The possibility of such social snubs, 
posthumously or otherwise, was of no concern to Mill. He took the whole episode 
in his stride. From an early stage, Mill’s ‘resolute purpose’ (2007, p. 3) had been 
the pursuit of those advanced liberal causes that he believed were worth fighting 
for, irrespective of any possible damage to his personal reputation. He remained, as 
John Morley (1917, 1, p. 55) once put it, ‘a man of extreme sensibility and vital 
heat in things worth waxing hot about’. 
Mill refused to sit back and play the role of detached philosopher and 
intellectual observer. He wished for his ideas and opinions actively to shape and 
improve the lot of those in all levels of society. The strength of this lively and 
illuminating new biography by Richard Reeves lies in the discussion of the central 
animating theme of Mill’s life and work: individual liberty. At the core of Mill’s 
liberalism was a ‘clearly and repeatedly articulated vision of a flourishing human 
life―self-improving, passionate, truth-seeking, engaged and colourful―which it 
was the job of individuals to cultivate, and the duty of society to promote’ (2007, 
p. 6). Mill’s liberalism, then, formed a dramatic arc around every dimension of his 
life; its stated aim was to create, nurture and perpetuate a liberal culture founded on 
personal freedom, independent character, individual duty and self cultivation. This 
approach invariably led him to champion particular (usually unpopular) causes 
which attracted a good deal of acerbic comment from the political establishment of 
the day. Undeterred, Mill kept tackling those issues he deemed most pressing to 
society, not uncommonly adopting an uncompromising posture, with often 
disastrous personal repercussions. Mill gradually earned a reputation as an ardent 
partisan and accomplished polemicist, supporting a host of ‘advanced liberal 
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causes’ throughout his life, often drawing widespread opprobrium for his perversity 
and recklessness. (The satirical magazine, Punch, had a field day poking fun at 
Mill’s crochets.) Again, Mill never demurred in the face of hostile voices. In fact, 
the role of the self-styled outsider was one he relished. If the cause was morally 
good, improved people’s lives and thus enriched society, Mill would support it with 
all the intellectual muscularity and personal passion that he could muster. His 
doggedness often bordered on obstinacy. 
In the Scottish lexicon, there is an expression, thrawn, which refers to such 
obstinate and perverse behaviour. Richard Reeves explains that Mill’s increasingly 
partisan activities often manifested themselves in perverse and unexpected ways, 
mostly in an obdurate refusal to be satisfied with the status quo and occasionally by 
reversing positions he had previously steadfastly held. Take, for instance, Mill’s 
stance on the secret ballot. During the 1830s, he vehemently supported the secret 
ballot because he believed that voters needed protection from the coercion, bribery 
and intimidation levelled by the landed aristocratic interest that then dominated the 
British political landscape. By the 1850s, however, Mill no longer supported the 
secret ballot. He then felt that Britain had, in the intervening period, matured 
politically. Thus, voters should be able to express their political opinions freely in 
public. Such idealism, though entirely consistent with Mill’s own projection of a 
liberal culture, diluted his standing among leading liberal and radical figures mainly 
because the secret ballot was a keystone in their electoral reform agenda. During 
his mature years, Mill also increasingly found himself aligned with the Tories on 
such issues as capital punishment and national service. There was in fact a range of 
public policy issues on which Mill displayed outwardly ‘conservative’ credentials, 
which sometimes put him offside with the liberal-cum-radical interest. It is fair to 
say that Mill never completely jettisoned the conservative influences he imbibed 
during his years of immersing himself in poetic culture. The retention of 
conservative strands in some of Mill’s later work has attracted criticism from 
modern scholars (see, for example, Gertrude Himmelfarb 1974) who have argued 
that the residual conservative strains in his mature thought undermine the central 
unifying theme running through On Liberty: the idea of human progress within a 
liberal society. However, it is important to be aware, as Reeves reminds the reader, 
that Mill rarely composed a work merely for the sake of philosophical precision 
(2007, p. 119). When he put forward an analytical proposition or policy proposal, 
Mill always kept in mind the need to ground an argument in the principles 
underpinning the liberal culture that he so cherished. Inevitably, this sometimes 
involved sacrificing philosophical exactness for the ultimate goal of promoting and 
defending the central tenets of a liberal society. 
Another facet of Mill’s thought that has attracted both praise and derision 
is his shifting position on the role of government in the economy. Richard Reeves 
argues that Mill ‘was vehemently opposed to centralized state control of the 
economy’ (2007, p. 7). This judgment is entirely correct despite the fact that the 
Principles of Political Economy is littered with examples of government 
interventions that Mill endorsed. During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, 
a considerable amount of interest was generated by controversial issues such as 
women’s suffrage and Irish land reform. These two iconic topics in the Mill canon 
have both been handled by Reeves in a careful and judicious manner. Mill actively 
supported government involvement in both cases, largely because the status quo 
was seen by Mill as inimical to the creation of the liberal society he envisaged. The 
primary obstacle in each case was outmoded customs and prejudices that 
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constituted a threat to individual freedom. If the instruments of the State could be 
mobilised to remove such impediments, then Mill had no qualms about sanctioning 
their use. There were, however, notable instances where the State had failed to 
secure the livelihoods and protect the interests of the most vulnerable members of 
society. Reeves, for example, dwells briefly on Mill’s attitude to the Whig reforms 
of Lord Cornwallis in the Bengal Presidency during the late eighteenth century. 
Prior to British rule, the land tenure of small-scale farmers had largely been secure 
under a system of traditional property rights. Under the Cornwallis reforms, 
however, the economic position of small-scale tenant farmers in eastern India 
deteriorated markedly. They were stripped of their property rights by a new class of 
large-scale landholders known as Zamindars created by the British colonial 
administration. The motive of course was economic. The resemblance between the 
Zamindars and British landed aristocracy was not lost on Mill. Mill, an ardent 
supporter of peasant proprietorship in Ireland, lamented these State-led changes to 
land ownership on the sub-Continent; this despite his long-standing involvement 
(as senior East India Company mandarin) in the cause of empire. Mill’s assessment 
of the situation was that the land tenure arrangements that had been in place in 
India before British rule were far superior to the Cornwallis reforms. Indeed, Mill 
believed that India and Ireland suffered from the common fate of being ruled and 
exploited by a colonial power whose priority was still to protect the economic 
interests of the metropolitan nation. Mill was in fact a staunch advocate of 
appropriating to Ireland the paradigm of peasant proprietorship which had prevailed 
in India during pre-colonial times, yet another tantalising example of the extent to 
which the pre-colonial experience in India could be harnessed in remaking the post-
colonial situation in Ireland. Sadly, Mill’s increasingly strident position on Irish 
land tenure reform marginalised the issue in Britain until several years after his 
death in 1873. It is nevertheless apparent that his views on land ownership in 
general and the Irish land system in particular relied heavily on his Indian 
experience, which suggests that the dismissive claim in the Autobiography that his 
35 years of imperial service were insignificant to his intellectual development 
stands in need of some refinement. Mill scholars still await an exhaustive treatment 
of his India House activities, which remain largely shrouded in mystery. 
Another key public policy issue of the day on which Mill expressed 
himself passionately, and which Reeves dwells upon, was education. He believed 
that government should take the lead in making a basic education available to all 
children. As with the recommendation to extend the political franchise to all adults 
(subject to appropriate checks to safeguard against the ‘tyranny of public opinion’), 
Mill wanted people to be better educated as this would enable them to lead better 
lives, which would assist in promoting a healthy, vibrant and tolerant liberal society 
(2007, pp. 115, 268). His concerns were driven, perhaps unsurprisingly, by his own 
mode of private education. Yet, at the same time, he feared the stultifying 
consequences of a comprehensive public education system that tended to produce 
social constructs rather than individuals capable of expressing unorthodox and 
‘dissentient opinions’. ‘A general State education’, Mill declared, ‘is a mere 
contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another’ (2007, p. 289). He 
continued: ‘All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and 
diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable 
importance, diversity of education’ (ibid.). For Mill, the existence of heterodox 
(especially minority) opinions in society was paramount because the collision of 
opposing views was the crucible in which the truth was to be formed. ‘Eccentricity 
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has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded’, wrote 
Mill, ‘and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to 
the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage which it contained. That so 
few dare to be eccentric marks the chief danger of the time’ (2007, p. 295). 
Mill’s concern over the stifling effects of universal education also moulded 
his deep-seated suspicion of both democracy and socialism. Although he saw merit 
in both political systems, he felt that neither was capable of sustaining ‘the greatest 
amount of human liberty and spontaneity’ (2007, p. 227). Although Mill wanted to 
build cohesive democratic institutions and cultivate the idea of civic pride and 
citizen responsibility, the diverse make-up of society should not be compromised 
along the way. A vital component in securing these social goals was the extension 
of the political franchise. This, he hoped, would ensure that a larger number of 
individuals had a greater stake in their own future. As one of Britain’s foremost 
public moralists, Mill agitated tirelessly to extend working class representation, all 
the while taking great pains to reign in working class domination, which he 
variously described as ‘mere mob-government’ or a ‘despotism of the numerical 
majority’ (2007, p. 311). The motive remained, as before, to ensure a ‘fair 
representation of minorities’ (2007, p. 311). In Mill’s opinion the solution lay in 
requiring all voters to meet a minimum educational qualification. (Mill also 
recommended that MPs be required to meet a minimum level of education. The 
obvious wisdom underlying this conclusion has alas been lost to future 
generations.) During the late 1850s and early 1860s, Mill invested more time and 
energy casting around for mechanisms to staunch the flow of the ‘majoritarian tide’ 
(2007, p. 314), finally settling on Thomas Hare’s proposal for proportional 
representation, a scheme that he described as ‘the greatest discovery on 
representative government’ (2007, p. 311). Until his death in 1873, Mill remained 
convinced that Hare’s plan provided the answer to all the problems of modern 
democracy, but its practical import was less obvious to other political observers. It 
was not and has never been implemented. 
Reeves also makes clear that, even with Mill’s personal crochets in Ireland, 
women’s suffrage and proportional representation and so on, Mill never wavered in 
his general commitment to liberty within the common domain, especially in his 
later years. There are, of course, several passages in the Principles of Political 
Economy that appear to suggest that Mill was receptive to socialism and 
communism. Mill’s interest in comparative economic systems stemmed from an 
enthusiasm for cooperation in economic activities and the corresponding mutual 
benefits that would flow to both capital and labour in the form of higher profits and 
wages. It is indeed the case that Mill considered socialism a clear step forward 
compared to the then class-based hierarchy of British society. For some advocates 
of socialism, this is sufficient evidence to argue that Mill, under the influence of the 
redoubtable Harriet, was a fellow traveller. This view is both naïve and factually 
dubious. For Mill, the appropriate comparison lay between socialism and a 
reformed market economy. ‘To make the comparison applicable’, Mill opined, ‘we 
must compare Communism at its best, with the régime of individual property, not 
as it is, but as it might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had 
a fair trial in any country; and less so, perhaps, in this country than in some others’ 
(2007, p. 225). Mill, having carefully weighed up the costs and benefits of 
competing economic systems, arrived at a benchmark that was meant to facilitate a 
sensible judgment. ‘The decision’, Mill said, ‘will probably depend mainly on one 
decision, viz. which of the two systems is consistent with the greatest amount of 
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human liberty and spontaneity’ (2007, p. 227). Mill’s concerns about socialism and 
communism arose from his liberalism: the need to foster individual freedom 
remained paramount. As Mill wrote: 
No society in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach, can be 
in a wholesome state … It is yet to be ascertained whether the 
Communistic scheme would be consistent with that multiform 
development of human nature, those manifold unlikenesses, 
that diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of intellectual 
points of view, which not only form a great part of the interest 
of human life, but by bringing intellects into stimulating 
collision, and by presenting to each innumerable notions that he 
would not have conceived of himself, are the mainspring of 
mental and moral progression. (2007, p. 227) 
Mill remained, as Reeves has convincingly shown, ‘a liberal, a democrat and a 
socialist ―in that order’ (2007, p. 7). 
Reeves’ careful reading of Mill’s position on liberty in the wider market 
place is matched by his judgments on Mill’s mental and emotional constitution, a 
constitution that has been the subject of considerable scholarly diagnosis over many 
years. Indeed, one of the positive outcomes of Reeves’ biography lies in his attempt 
to challenge several caricatures that have, over time, coalesced around public 
opinion concerning Mill’s emotional and intellectual development. Three examples 
are considered here. The first concerns the role of James Mill in the ‘unusual and 
remarkable’ education of his son, once described by the twentieth-century 
philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, as ‘an appalling success’ (2007, p. 12). Looked at this 
way, James Mill is normally vilified for the harsh educational regimen that he 
imposed on all his children. This view has often been rehearsed by Mill scholars 
and biographers whose conclusions remain coloured by modern educational 
expectations and standards. Reeves provides a more nuanced and even-handed 
assessment that focuses on Mill’s own characteristically balanced evaluation of his 
education as an essential foundation for his later success. ‘If I have achieved 
anything, I owe it’, Mill opined, ‘to the fact that through the early training bestowed 
on me by my father, I started, I may fairly say, with an advantage of a quarter of a 
century over my contemporaries’ (2007, p. 26). In Reeves’ account, James Mill 
emerges in a softer autumnal light as someone concerned about the welfare of his 
progeny and not entirely devoid of parental feeling. 
The second matter canvassed by Reeves relates to Mill’s prowess as an 
orator (2007, p. 46). In contrast to the classical orators that he studied, Mill never 
went on to become a great public speaker. His forte remained the written word. It 
has been well documented that he possessed a thin voice. His maiden speech to the 
House of Commons following his electoral victory in the seat of Westminster in the 
1865 General Election was described, even by his closest admirers, as a resounding 
failure. Yet, as an MP in the 1860s, his oratory skills gradually improved. He began 
to revel in the House of Commons banter with the Tory opposition, subjecting the 
lawyers William Shee and Abraham Hayward to a barrage of droll put-downs, 
while leaving his own benches clutching their sides in mirth. When asked for 
example to withdraw a remark about the Tories being ‘the stupidest party’, Mill 
offered the following apology, as recorded in Hansard: ‘I did not mean that 
Conservatives are generally stupid; I meant, that stupid people are generally 
Conservative. (Laughter and cheers.) And I do not see why the honourable 
gentlemen should feel that position at all offensive to them; for it ensures their 
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always being an extremely powerful party. (Hear hear.)’ (pp. 374-5) (The Tories 
struck back, of course, with their own well-orchestrated campaign intended to 
discredit those issues with which Mill was associated.) 
A third issue turns on Isaiah Berlin’s remark that Mill was renowned for 
his ‘total lack of humour’ (2007, p. 248). Reeves persuasively argues, however, that 
the image that normally attaches to Mill in the literature as someone who was an 
austere, analytical, ‘black-coated Victorian prude’ (2007, p. 262) is neither fair nor 
accurate. In fact, contrary to received wisdom, Mill possessed a light-hearted side 
and a droll sense of humour. His published and unpublished writings are punctuated 
with playful metaphors, amusing anecdotes and clever retorts. Thus: ‘If to have 
been to University be the end of education there is no doubt that by going to 
University that end may be most effectually attained’ (2007, p. 46); ‘I cannot 
bestow upon Bulwer’s article any milder name than despicable … God grant that 
nobody may read it, or that whoever does, will instantaneously forget every word of 
it’ (2007, p. 141); and, when asked in the House to reconcile his views on limiting 
the size of working class families with the ‘Scriptural injunction, that we are to 
increase and multiply’, Mill replied, ‘It says we are to eat and drink, but not over-
eat and over-drink ourselves. (Cheers and laughter.)’ (2007, p. 364). Reeves here 
reveals that Mill himself was fully aware of the importance of possessing a natural 
sense of humour: it is ‘a great defect in a character’, Mill thought, ‘to be without 
lightness … A certain infusion of the laughing philosopher … is a prodigious help 
towards bearing the evils of life, and I should think has saved many a person from 
going mad’ (2007, p. 249). 
Another facet of Mill’s portraiture that Reeves thoughtfully re-examines is 
whether Mill was a ‘Taylor-made man’ (Lipkes 1999, p. 76), a reference to Harriet 
Taylor’s ‘almost hypnotic control of Mill’s mind’ (Packe 1954, p. 315). Of course 
Mill himself went to great lengths in the Autobiography to emphasise Harriet’s 
pivotal role in his intellectual journey, describing her as a ‘consummate artist’ 
(2007, p. 229). Accordingly, most commentators have taken Mill at his word, but in 
the view of Alexander Bain, Mill’s friend and first biographer, ‘he outraged all 
reasonable credulity in describing her matchless genius, without being able to supply 
corroborating evidence’ (Bain 1882, p. 171). As a result, Harriet’s contributions have 
not, until recently, been carefully studied on their own merits. Bruce Kinzer (2007) 
has recently demonstrated that Harriet’s influence during the decade of the 1830s was 
restricted to the development of Mill’s emotional side. Her intellectual influence 
grew, to be sure, during the following two decades but, as argued by Reeves, many of 
the revisions that Mill made to his seminal works owed much less to Harriet’s 
thought than has commonly been perceived. Reeves indicates where there were clear 
differences of opinion between them. He concludes that, ‘[w]hatever Mill said [in the 
Autobiography], Harriet never directly dictated his views, but as two intelligent, 
passionate people, they certainly debated them’ (2007, p. 230). 
In this lucid, well-written and engaging biography of Britain’s greatest 
nineteenth-century philosopher and public intellectual, Richard Reeves has 
carefully and successfully interlaced Mill’s personal story with his intellectual ideas 
and engagements to produce a coherent and rounded portrait of an immensely 
important Victorian personality. In an account that will appeal to both the dilettante 
and serious scholar alike, Mill is portrayed as an ardent partisan and talented 
polemicist who in life relentlessly pursued those personal crochets and causes that 
were considered vital in projecting his vision of an open, tolerant liberal culture 
founded on individual initiative. In short, Mill was a passionate firebrand in whose 
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restless curiosity and energy the era’s momentous political and social 
transformation was embodied. Mill’s story is the history of nineteenth-century 
liberalism. He was its greatest champion, exponent and defender, often braving 
derision for the things he did, said and wrote, particularly during the final decade of 
his life. Yet, it is surely a measure of the stature of the man and the gravitas of his 
intellectual arsenal that opinions on his place within the Victorian pantheon still 
remain so decisively divided. For Reeves, Mill’s ‘legacy rests not only in the power 
of his thought, however, but also in the inspiring conduct of his life―the finest 
example of thought in action of the last two centuries … The world he left was 
unquestionably better for his efforts. It still is’ (2007, p. 487). 
 ________________________________ 
*  School of Business, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle WA 6959. Email: 
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Bruce L. Kinzer. J. S. Mill Revisited: Biographical and Political Explorations. 





The commemorative John Stuart Mill bicentennial conference held at University 
College London in June 2006 has generated renewed interest in the life and work of 
this notable Victorian personality. In this latest offering, Bruce Kinzer, the veteran 
of several scholarly works focusing on various aspects of Mill’s political thought, 
has presented his latest deliberations in a work that focuses on two important and 
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overlapping subjects: the first group of chapters cover certain familiar biographical 
themes relating strictly to Mill’s formative years while the latter half of the book 
delves into various facets of Mill’s political thought and activities in relation to the 
ebb and flow of Victorian political life. The overall result is a finely balanced group 
of essays in which the author, with impressive nuance and lightness of touch, 
probes into pertinent features of Mill’s intellectual biography. 
Commentaries on the public and private lives of John Stuart Mill tend to rely 
heavily upon his Autobiography. Kinzer’s latest work is no exception. However, 
while Mill’s Autobiography remains a fountain of indispensable information on the 
earlier phase of John Stuart Mill’s life story, it is not always a reliable source of 
judgments about these years. As is well known, the Autobiography commences with 
an account of the rigorous and unconventional childhood education Mill endured 
under the ‘watchful eye’ of his authoritarian father, James Mill, a dour, humourless 
Scot, who emerged during the early nineteenth century as the chief guardian of the 
‘greatest happiness principle’. Kinzer strikes a convincing note in encapsulating the 
overriding influence exercised by James Mill in the formation of his son’s moral 
capacities, intellectual abilities and character. In a subtle account, Kinzer broadly 
endorses the received view, as advanced most recently in the fine biography of 
J. S. Mill by Nicholas Capaldi (2004), that James Mill ‘hampered his son’s 
development of a coherent identity’ by imposing an educational regime that 
favoured analysis and reason over imagination and feeling. As a young man, John 
Stuart Mill came to the sudden realisation that the education imparted by his 
imposing father had been deficient in its failure to cultivate those poetic and 
romantic elements that he considered essential to developing a more rounded, 
independent and happy personality. This realisation produced, in Stefan Collini’s 
(1991, p. 122) words, ‘one of the best known identity-crises in history’. Much has 
understandably been made of Mill’s account of his ‘mental crisis’ in the 
Autobiography―the solitary reference to this pivotal episode―and the pervasive 
part James Mill played in the sudden change in his son’s temperament. Kinzer 
remains consistent and methodical as he evaluates James Mill’s faults and virtues 
as father, thinker and teacher. He persuasively argues that Mill’s decision to 
compose his Autobiography was motivated ‘in very considerable part by the need 
to raise the ghost of his father, James Mill, and lay that ghost to rest’ (Kinzer 2007, 
p. 9). Yet, Kinzer refrains from hypothesising that the relationship between father 
and son ultimately disintegrated. In fact, John Stuart Mill’s own testimony toward 
his father in the Autobiography remained generous without, of course, ever 
descending into hagiography. 
By the autumn of 1826, John Stuart Mill, now aware that the 
apprenticeship that he had served under his father had passed its apogee, began to 
embark upon a new transitional phase in his own intellectual and emotional 
development. It took time for Mill to chisel out a new course of his own devising. 
This did not mean that Mill had no further need for his father. For instance, the two 
continued to work in close concert at the London headquarters of the East India 
Company in Leadenhall Street. Here James Mill lent his eldest son considerable 
assistance in relation to the practical day-to-day duties of the Examiner’s Office. 
Likewise, the precocious son proved an invaluable ally in the defence of James 
Mill’s Essay on Government, shoring it up against the withering attack that Thomas 
Macaulay had launched upon the utilitarian logic of the elder Mill’s mode of 
political reasoning. But, in other more pressing areas of his life, John Stuart Mill no 
longer fell under the direct jurisdiction of his father. ‘The problem faced by the 
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younger Mill in 1826’, as Kinzer (2007, p. 40) explains, ‘involved what to make of 
what he had been given, and how to give himself the emotional nourishment his 
father had failed to supply’. This undertaking, which involved an assertion of 
independence that produced considerable personal anguish, ultimately led him into 
the welcoming arms of Mrs Harriet Taylor, but not before he had found solace in 
the romantic poetry of William Wordsworth and Samuel Coleridge, the philosophic 
ideas of Continental thinkers such as Saint Simon, and the camaraderie of such 
gifted contemporaries as John Sterling, William Eyton Tooke, Thomas Carlyle and 
Henry Cole. Contemporaries paint a portrait of Mill as an attractive and likeable 
young man with an easy-going demeanour and personable nature, a far cry from the 
tortured soul that had fallen into a chasm of mental despair only a few years earlier. 
For the first time in his life, Mill was surrounded by a close circle of friends who 
valued him for his companionship and philosophic predisposition rather than his 
intellectual pedigree. 
The second half of the 1820s heralded the awakening of Mill’s poetic 
voice and Kinzer provides an exhaustive account of Mill’s willingness to 
investigate the fertile intellectual terrain left untrodden by his father. ‘Neither the 
motive nor the content of John Mill’s program of internal culture could’, he says, 
‘elicit James Mill’s understanding or support. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Sterling, the 
Saint-Simonians―such men had nothing to say to James Mill, and he had nothing 
to say to them’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 63). Nor was it long before Mill began to extend 
the scope of his social and intellectual habitat to incorporate other like-minded 
young radicals, several of whom straddled the Unitarian and Utilitarian movements 
that were integral to London radicalism. By the early 1830s, Mill found himself 
wrapped in the impassioned brace of the South Place circle, which was then 
dominated by the other-worldly figure of William Johnson Fox whose Unitarian 
congregation included various strains of political radicalism. Fox, a charismatic 
Unitarian pastor well known for his then unorthodox views on marriage (such as 
that it should be a union between equals), took it upon himself to introduce the 
aspiring young intellectual, Mill, to the very chic and very married Harriet Taylor, 
who was once described as possessing ‘a small head, a swan-like throat, and a 
complexion like a pearl’ (quoted in Hayek 1951, p. 25). It is not certain why Fox 
decided to introduce the two young people to each other. Perhaps he thought that 
Mill’s enjoyable and stimulating company would raise her flagging spirits. 
Whatever the reason might have been, Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill do seem 
to have taken cultural pleasure in each other’s company: what began as a fledging 
friendship gradually grew into a more intimate relationship that became the object 
of lurid gossip within London’s polite middle-class circles. The speculation caused 
an irrevocable rift between Mill and several close family members and friends who 
endeavoured to counsel him, explaining that his ill-judged dalliance had violated 
the canons of upright conduct. The intensity and complexity of the relationship 
between Mill and Taylor placed a considerable strain on Harriet and John Taylor’s 
marriage. The resolution contrived by Harriet, known for exerting ‘an authoritarian 
influence over the emotional lives of those with whom she was intimate’ (Kinzer 
2007, p. 110), was an awkward triangular compact that permitted Mill to visit Harriet 
at her Regent’s Park residence when John Taylor was absent and to be seen in public 
with her on carefully chosen occasions. Kinzer explains that, despite such seemingly 
intractable problems, Mill was prepared to tolerate the highly unusual arrangement 
because he had succumbed to Harriet’s ‘emotional aggressiveness’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 
100) in order to cultivate those aesthetic faculties that would permit him to jettison 
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what remained of his father’s initial influence. It is unlikely that Harriet found the 
peculiar domestic situation that she had carefully constructed as intolerable as her 
young suitor, for she possessed ‘a prodigious emotional resilience and a crafty self-
fashioning’ that carried her ‘through the thickets’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 110). 
There is now a considerable body of scholarship which ascribes a central 
place to Harriet Taylor in shaping Mill’s emotional and intellectual development 
(see, for example, Hayek 1951; Stillinger 1983; Rose 1984; Mendus 1994; Jacobs 
2002). Kinzer challenges the veracity of this interpretation. He argues thus: ‘Harriet 
Taylor’s influence on his emotional life during the 1830s did not spill over into the 
intellectual and political spheres’ (Kinzer 2007, p. 110). He continues: ‘When she 
[Harriet] declared that she knew things of which he was ignorant, she was making 
no claim for her superior learnedness or intellectual acuity, but rather for her 
surpassing insight into matters involving “human feeling and character”’ (ibid.). In 
fact, Mill acknowledged as much in the Autobiography when he wrote: ‘The poetic 
elements of her [Harriet’s] character, which were at that time the most ripened, 
were naturally those which impressed me first, and those years were, in respect of 
my own development, mainly years of poetic culture’ (Mill 1981, p. 198). Although 
Kinzer’s account of Harriet’s influence on Mill is limited to the 1830s, it 
nevertheless leaves the reader with a far better narrative concerning the astonishing 
drama of Mill’s aesthetic development than has hitherto been detailed. Still, it is a 
shame that Kinzer’s account of Harriet’s influence over the direction of Mill’s 
intellectual progress, one of the most contested issues in Mill scholarship, 
deliberately omits any examination of her impact during the 1840s and 1850s when 
the depth of their intellectual and emotional bond grew stronger. 
The second set of chapters in this volume deal with Mill’s political leanings 
from the early 1830s until the late 1860s. The fusion of biographical and political 
elements throws invaluable light on Mill as political radical, public intellectual and 
champion of ‘advanced liberal’ causes, carefully chronicling the role as an outsider, a 
role in which Mill deliberately cast himself from the outset of his public career. 
During the years in which Mill began to absorb the ‘poetic culture’ of 
Harriet Taylor, the romantic writers and Continental philosophers, he also made a 
conscious decision to establish a reputation for himself as a radical political 
commentator. Mill’s preparation of fugitive pieces of political journalism soon won 
for him a reputation for political activism. His tirades against the political 
establishment then dominated by the aristocratic landed gentry, whether they be 
Whig or Tory, were intended to demonstrate the provincialism and poverty of 
English political life as against the fluidity and fecundity of France’s political 
landscape. Mill excelled at this sort of forensic political narrative but these 
indulgences seem to have tarnished his posthumous reputation. While his admirers 
cherished his every syllable, Mill’s detractors neither forgot nor forgave him. 
Kinzer emphasises here that the emergence of Mill as an independent political 
commentator capable of influencing English public opinion could only be achieved 
following, first, the decisive intellectual and emotional break from his father and, 
second, the gradual realisation that he had reached the point in his own intellectual 
and emotional journey where he was capable of shaping and managing his own 
thoughts and affairs. The yoking of these two themes allows a more nuanced view 
of Mill to emerge that lays emphasis upon his capacity for personal and intellectual 
growth following his much commented upon mental trauma. 
An important early example of Mill’s distinctive political radicalism was 
his advocacy of secret voting as an important control mechanism accompanying the 
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passing of the 1832 Reform Act. During the 1830s, Mill believed that the political 
activities of the two dominant parties―the Whigs and Tories―served landed 
interests and preserved the political privileges of the aristocracy at the expense of 
the body politic. Electoral intimidation and bribery, Mill believed, remained 
widespread and so underpinned the political dominance of aristocratic interests. By 
the 1850s, however, Mill had become a fervent opponent of the ballot because he 
believed that the Reform Act had so altered the social and political condition of 
England in the intervening twenty years that secret voting was neither necessary 
nor desirable. Kinzer, who published his own views on the matter in an article in 
Historical Reflections some years ago (see Kinzer 1978), has performed an 
admirable task in unravelling the shifting contours of Mill’s position on the ballot 
question. Mill’s changing position on the ballot underscores that sense of his own 
intellectual and political independence as well as highlighting the more mature 
reflections of a political philosopher and public moralist (as opposed to those of a 
young radical propagandist). As Kinzer (2007, p. 156) remarks: ‘Mill owed no 
debts to any party or group, and the authority he possessed stemmed from his 
remarkable achievements as a philosopher and political economist’. What is 
surprising here is that this and related topics have not received anything like close 
attention from Mill scholars in the intervening period, an indication of the fact that 
Mill scholarship today is dominated by philosophers rather than historians, 
economists or political scientists. 
In addition to the ballot question, Mill was remarkably well informed 
about a host of other political issues that impacted upon English (and French) 
society. Indeed, many advanced liberals and prominent radicals looked to Mill for 
intellectual and political guidance during the mid-Victorian era. After all, Mill 
enjoyed the ‘ear of England’ and never hesitated to bend it in order to influence the 
direction of national debate on topical issues of the day. Nowhere was this more 
obvious than during the final fifteen years of his life ‘where he revealed himself to 
be avowedly partisan and, when roused to a pitch of moral outrage, violently 
polemical’ (Collini 1991, p. 121). The sense of independence to which Mill aspired 
in his personal and professional lives found expression in his strictures on the role 
of party politics in British political life during the mid-Victorian period. Kinzer 
(2007, p. 165) carefully explains that Mill eschewed the advances of Whigs and 
Tories alike because both parties were wedded to the preservation of aristocratic 
privilege and remained committed to the formation of a genuine radical party 
‘dedicated to the extinction of aristocratic government and the democratization of 
British institutions and society’. The evolution of Britain’s political institutions 
coupled with the extension of the political franchise to cover all adult working men 
and women would, Mill believed, greatly enhance the effectiveness of the electoral 
system. Yet Mill remained ambivalent as to the ability of a Westminster 
parliamentary democracy to deliver decisive ‘improvements to mankind’. His own 
personal commitment to the political process spurned narrow party lines, even 
though he was voted into Parliament in 1865 as one of Westminster’s two liberal 
MPs. He remained supportive of a Liberal Ministry in the House of Commons, 
although he himself insisted during campaign hustings that his duty was to 
represent his electorate as an ‘independent’ liberal candidate. A common refrain in 
Mill’s mature political writings was that the ‘existing electoral system, dominated 
by petty party interests and local political networks, prevented men of ability and 
independent mind from obtaining seats in the House of Commons’ (Kinzer 2007, 
p. 196). Mill aimed to act in the best interests of his electorate regardless of the 
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pressures that might be exerted from within his own party. His own well-known 
intransigence on such grave issues as the reform of the Irish land system and the 
campaign to prosecute Governor Eyre brought him into direct conflict with 
members on both sides of the House of Commons. Mill, the champion of minority 
or ‘dissentient opinions’, nonetheless remained intransigent, steadfastly refusing 
either to moderate his political template or tone down his rhetoric, even though 
these were very often self-defeating, exaggerated and intemperate. During his final 
decade, Mill’s conduct both inside and outside the parliamentary arena reinforced 
his commitment to a new political order that sought to elevate the material and 
moral condition of the people without, however, sacrificing the higher ideals of 
character, independence and individual liberty. In his Autobiography Mill wrote: 
‘The same idea, that the use of my being in Parliament was to do work which others 
were not able or not willing to do, made me think it my duty to come to the front in 
defence of advanced Liberalism on occasions when the obloquy to be encountered 
was such as most of the advanced Liberals in the House, preferred not to incur’ 
(Mill 1981, p. 276). 
Overall, Professor Kinzer’s thoughtful collection of essays is a timely 
reminder of the versatility, power and perspicacity of John Stuart Mill’s 
penmanship on a range of ‘advanced liberal’ topics that defined the Victorian era. 
Mill’s liberal reform agenda remains particularly vital in an age where the voice of 
the public intellectual has been eclipsed and the centre of public culture remains 
firmly moored to popular fashions and fetishes, arid journalism, mass marketing 
and puerile gimmicks, all masquerading as critical commentary on key public 
policy issues. It can only be hoped that the weightier, more cultivated prose as 
enunciated by the Saint of Rationalism (as William Gladstone affectionately 
dubbed Mill) never completely fades away. The fate of public culture depends on it. 
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Claude Gnos and Louis-Philippe Rochon (eds). The Keynesian Multiplier. 
London and New York: Routledge. 2008. Pp. xvii + 202. ISBN 978-0-415-
32013-9 (hb). US$130. 
 
J. E. King* 
 
This is a rather strange book. Only one of the ten chapters is ‘pure’ history of 
economic thought. This is by Luca Fiorito, who draws on archival sources to 
establish John Maurice Clark’s contribution to the genesis of the multiplier concept 
(chapter 2). Two other contributions, by Heinrich Bortis, on the multiplier in the 
Keynesian tradition (chapter 3), and by Malcolm Sawyer on Michał Kalecki and the 
multiplier (chapter 8), also have a substantial history of economic thought content. 
Both are very good, as might be expected. Bortis, in particular, writes cogently on 
the respective versions of the multiplier found in Richard Kahn, Michal Kalecki, 
Nicholas Kaldor and Evsey Domar, with some additional very interesting material 
on the ‘super-multiplier’ and on the origins of the multiplier analysis in the work of 
the Physiocrats and Karl Marx. He might perhaps have cited Andrew Trigg’s recent 
book on this aspect of the problem (Trigg 2006). 
The remaining seven chapters are more or less analytical in nature, and 
most of them fall within the ‘monetary circuit’ branch of Post Keynesian 
endogenous money theory. However, they come to very different conclusions 
concerning the validity of the multiplier analysis. Thus in chapter 1 Jochen Hartwig 
argues that neither the ‘logical’ (that is, static) nor the ‘dynamic view’ of the 
multiplier is defensible. Instead, the multiplier can only be interpreted ‘as an 
equilibrium proportion [between] two departments within a reproduction scheme’ 
(p. 26). Xavier Bradley (chapter 4) regards the whole idea of the multiplier as 
‘based on the confusion, in the same operation, of the formation and the spending 
of incomes’ (p. 87). For Alain Parguez (chapter 5), the ‘multiplier theory … is 
false. It contradicts the very nature of money’ (p. 116). Basil Moore (chapter 6) is 
equally sceptical, but for different reasons. He regards Keynes’ multiplier analysis 
as ‘mistaken’ (p. 121), since complex non-linear systems have no closed-form 
solution, as the multiplier relationship requires. In chapter 7 Jean-Luc Bailly 
concludes that ‘there is no dynamic multiplier of a value other than unity’ (p. 148). 
I doubt whether either Bortis or Sawyer would agree with any of these 
criticisms. To add to the reader’s confusion, the two final chapters, which are 
written separately by the editors, reveal a much more favourable position on the 
coherence of the multiplier analysis. Thus Louis-Philippe Rochon (chapter 9) 
concludes that ‘the multiplier depends on the banking system … [and] is not an 
automatic phenomenon. It can hold, provided initial injections into the circuit lead 
to increased private revenues sufficient to guarantee the renewal [of] debt 
commitment and the extension of bank credit to renew production’ (p. 177). This, 
of course, is more or less what Keynes himself concluded, when writing of the 
‘factors which it is most important not to overlook’ in discussions of the multiplier. 
The first of these was the danger that: 
The method of financing the policy and the increased working 
cash, required by the increased employment and the associated 
rise of prices, may have the effect of increasing the rate of 
interest and so reducing investment in other directions, unless 
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the monetary authority takes steps to the contrary … (Keynes 
1936, p. 119) 
Finally, Claude Gnos suggests that ‘endogenous money does not run counter to 
Keynes’s original conception of the multiplier but only to the standard 
interpretation of it’ (p. 191). Returning to Jochen Hartwig’s distinction between the 
logical and dynamic notions of the multiplier, Gnos comes down on the side of the 
former: 
The multiplier is, in fact, static or logical. It can, however, be 
combined with the dynamics of the economy resulting from 
behaviour patterns, through the principle of effective demand 
by which entrepreneurs decide on the scale of their production 
with regard to their expected proceeds from sales, which of 
course may be influenced by an increase in investment. (p. 191) 
Precisely how this statement can be reconciled with the much more critical 
approach taken by no fewer than five of his contributors, Gnos does not say. 
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David A. Spencer. The Political Economy of Work. London and New York: 
Routledge. 2009. Pp. xix + 170. ISBN 978-0-415-45793-4 (hb). US$130. 
 
J. E. King* 
 
I wish I had written this book. David Spencer has produced a scholarly, lucidly 
written and totally convincing analysis of the treatment of work in the history of 
economic thought, from the early Mercantilists right down to the present day. It is a 
marvellous achievement. 
Spencer’s basic thesis is simple and, I think, entirely correct: 
Work can be characterised as merely a means of earning a living. 
However, it can also be viewed as a potential source of personal 
achievement and self-fulfilment … work can be something 
more than a mere means, so long as it is organised in a manner 
that accords with the interests of workers … the human ideal is 
not a life of freedom from work. (p. 3) 
In six short but incisive chapters Spencer traces the way in which work has been 
treated in the literature of economics, from the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-
century proponents of low wages as a means of keeping the poor out of idleness to 
twenty-first-century studies of the economics of happiness. He deals successively 
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with concepts of work in pre-classical and classical political economy; the pro-
work sentiments of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors, including 
William Godwin, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin and William Morris; the Marxian 
view of work, with which he broadly sympathises; neoclassical and Austrian 
attitudes to work at the end of the nineteenth century; the contributions of the 
American institutionalists; and ‘the hidden abode of production’ in modern 
mainstream economics. 
Apart from Marx, Spencer’s heroes include John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin, 
William Morris, John R. Commons and J. A. Hobson, as might be expected, but 
also William Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall. Jevons was prepared to see work 
as a potential source of both pain and pleasure, while Marshall echoed Mill (and 
Ruskin, and Marx) in regarding work as an essential part of life rather than as a 
mere means of obtaining consumer goods. Unlike Marx, of course, Marshall 
believed that capitalism could be reformed to reduce drudgery and greatly improve 
the quality of work for all. Spencer is also favourably impressed by the 
institutionalists, especially Commons and Hobson. His verdict on Thorstein Veblen 
is mixed. While praising Veblen’s critique of ‘pecuniary [that is, capitalist] culture’ 
as invariably hostile to the ‘instinct of workmanship’, Spencer criticises both his 
support of Taylorism and his tendency to underestimate the impact of capitalist 
machine production on the autonomy and skill of the worker. With the exception of 
Hobson, who was genuinely transatlantic, these institutionalists were all American. 
As Spencer notes, (p. 148 n.13), the history of non-neoclassical labour economics 
in Britain has yet to be written (his next book, possibly?). 
Among the villains, the Austrians occupy pride of place. By insisting on 
expunging any notion of ‘real cost’ from their theory of value, Carl Menger and his 
followers were responsible for a fatal shift in mainstream theory, from the marginal 
disutility of labour (which could in principle be positive or negative) to the 
opportunity cost of work time, viewed only as leisure foregone (which could only 
be positive). In consequence, consumption rather than work moved to the centre of 
marginalist economic theory. These errors, Spencer argues, were carried over into 
the virulently neoclassical version of labour economics that burst out of Chicago in 
the late 1950s and all but eradicated the institutionalist approach to the economics 
of work. They also vitiated Oliver Williamson’s new institutional economics and 
the later personnel economics of Edward Lazear and his acolytes. Neither 
‘shirking’, nor opportunism, nor principal-agent theory, nor efficiency wage models 
of the labour market escape Spencer’s critical attention. The book concludes with a 
scathing attack on the most recent literature on the economics of happiness, which 
he criticises for ignoring both the phenomenon of alienation and the notion that 
satisfying work might be a basic human need, whether or not it is experienced (and 
articulated) as such. 
There is a great deal to think about on almost every page of this short 
book. My only real criticism is that it is, perhaps, too short. Two or three extra 
chapters might have been included, for example on the thinking of socialist 
exponents of ‘the right to be lazy’ (the title of a pamphlet by Marx’s son-in-law 
Paul Lafargue), which included writers as diverse as Bertrand Russell and André 
Gorz. He might have devoted a chapter to the treatment of work in the industrial 
sociology and industrial psychology literature, to contrast it with the impoverished 
analysis of the mainstream economists. There are brief references to Taylorism, as 
already noted, and also to Abraham Maslow, but a broader discussion taking in 
Frederick Herzberg and also Elton Mayo and the human relations tradition would 
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have been useful. Work is a social activity, and the creation of occupational 
communities is one of its most important consequences, often helping to cement the 
ideological power of employers and thereby to frustrate union efforts to improve 
the quality of work itself (see Richards 2008 for a recent case study). Finally, the 
rather truncated discussion of the Marxian ‘labour process’ literature could have 
been expanded; there is no mention of the seminal work of Andrew Friedman 
(1977), for example. 
But these are minor points, which in no way detract from Spencer’s 
achievement. This book will become a classic. 
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Roger Frantz (ed.). Renaissance in Behavioral Economics: Essays in Honor 
of Harvey Leibenstein. London & New York: Routledge. 2007. ISBN 978-0-




This is a collection of chapters of mixed quality written by authors trying to come 
to grips with Leibenstein’s contributions to economics. He is generally regarded, 
along with Herbert Simon and George Katona, as among the first generation of 
behavioural economists. Yet it is also recognised that Leibenstein’s ideas are 
largely absent from modern behavioural economics. 
There seems to be some ambivalence about how his contributions are to be 
classified. For example, Peter Earl, while including him in his 1988 Behavioral 
Economics collection for Elgar, suggests that he may belong in a ‘pseudo-
behaviouralist group’. Pseudo-behaviouralists are ‘scholars whose inclinations are 
really (or normally seem to be) those of the orthodox, marginalist neoclassical 
economist’. Frantz tells us that Leibenstein insisted he was a neoclassical 
economist, but one that did not believe that human behaviour was always 
maximising (p. 10). Jason Potts, however, tells us that Leibenstein’s X-efficiency 
concept is ‘logically meaningless in a strictly neoclassical framework’ (p. 96). 
I can personally identify with this confusion. As a student I was easily won 
over by the attractiveness of X-efficiency analysis and it seemed like an obvious 
recognition that human effort is at all times variable. It was an empirically 
grounded approach that seemed to make sense, particularly in the developing 
world. However, when I got to graduate school E. R. Weintraub was quick to let 
students know that Leibenstein was quite ‘mad’ and what he was saying was 
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logically incomprehensible. Craig Freedman has entertained us over the years with 
his treatment of Stigler, who staged a bitter attack on Leibenstein’s work. Potts’ 
take on this, and his articles are always interesting, is that Leibenstein ‘was not so 
much a mad uncle in the Harvard faculty’s attic … but rather a brilliant 
evolutionary economist struggling to escape’. Moreover, X-efficiency ‘only makes 
consistent analytical sense in an evolutionary and complex systems theory-based 
evolutionary framework’ (p. 92). 
What this volume illustrates is the various ways that Leibenstein made a 
lasting contribution to economics. We all know about X-efficiency. Roger Frantz, 
in the concluding chapter, notes that from the late 1960s through to 2002 
approximately 80 journal articles were published trying to estimate the size of X-
inefficiency and these studies consistently showed support for its existence across 
numerous industries and countries. The term itself was heavily cited in the Social 
Science Citation Index, reaching a peak in 1981–85 (pp. 212-13). What is less 
known are his contributions in other areas of economics. This covers his pioneering 
work on efficiency wages (later developed by Akerlof) discussed by Morris 
Altman, Leibenstein’s link between entrepreneurship and economic development 
discussed by Hamid Hosseini, and his work on consumption discussed by Paul 
Albanese. 
Leibenstein’s treatment of status goods follows Duesenberry’s work on 
interdependence of preferences and Veblen’s earlier notions of emulation and 
conspicuous consumption. Peter Earl, in his chapter, applies the concept of X-
efficiency to consumption decisions rather than to firm behaviour to explore why 
consumers make poor choices or have pathological tendencies to consume the 
wrong products. Readers of this journal can easily relate to this perspective but may 
have trouble when it broaches other disciplines. Paul Zak relates Leibenstein’s 
work to developments in ‘neuroeconomics’ using neuroscience to understand how 
people make economic decisions. Gerald Cory also draws on findings in 
evolutionary neuroscience or brain psychology and concludes that Leibenstein ‘was 
not only a key figure in the founding of behavioural economics, but his concepts 
were also prescient of findings in brain psychology or neural architecture’ (p. 34). 
Readers may have difficulty penetrating the jargon in this literature, for example, 
from p. 54: 
We can redefine rationality, not as a maximization or not of 
self-interest, but as a cognitively-mediated and appropriate 
dynamic balancing of our self-preserving and affectional 
circuitries―the integrated expression of our social exchange 
neural architecture as situationally and circumstantially 
appropriate. 
This volume has its failings. The editor’s introduction repeats much of the 
concluding chapter. Some chapters are overly long while others do not seem to add 
much to our understanding of this person. However, there is enough evidence here 
to be somewhat sympathetic to Altman’s claim that ‘Leibenstein contributed to and 
set the foundations for some of the most innovative advancements of twentieth 
century economics’ (p. 141). 
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Geoffrey Poitras (ed.). Pioneers of Financial Economics. Volume 2: 
Twentieth-Century Contributions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2007. 




Contemporary financial economics, like alchemy, is a calculating pre-science. It 
aspires to scientific status, but fails to achieve it because financial economics is 
driven by a search for its own philosopher’s stone, and its theorists are distracted by 
the pursuit of red herrings. The philosopher’s stone of finance is a method to 
forecast stock prices or, what amounts to the same thing, a way of speculating 
risklessly. This volume is concerned with the twentieth-century ‘discoveries’ of 
Harry Markowitz, Robert Merton, Merton Miller, Fischer Black, Myron Scholes 
and other legends of academic finance who converted ‘a collection of anecdotes, 
rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data’ into ‘a rigorous economic 
theory subjected to scientific empirical examination’ (Merton 1992, pp. xii-xiv, 
cited more than once in the volume under review). By a process of restricting the 
arguments until a determinate algorithm for forecasting stock prices, or 
determining risk, emerges, modern quantitative finance offers the philosopher’s 
stone, but substitutes for it ‘optimal’, ‘risk-adjusted’ portfolios that are only 
optimal or risk-adjusted in such a limited sense as to be impractical. Since only a 
saint or a subversive would ever settle for anything less than an optimal or risk-
adjusted portfolio of wealth, the prospectus for quantitative finance inevitably 
wins out over more modest and more practical approaches. Our heroes secured 
valuable Wall Street consultancies. But they were employed largely for marketing 
purposes and were rarely allowed to influence actual investment practice and 
strategy. 
Moreover, contrary to Merton’s self-serving assertion, not all of the 
alternative approaches to finance are mere anecdotes, rules of thumb, or 
manipulations of accounting data. As Paul Davidson argues persuasively in the 
paper that concludes this volume, the work of John Maynard Keynes, and we may 
add his followers such as Hyman Minsky, was much more systematic and does not 
require such unreal assumptions about banking and financial markets. However, 
from the point of view of the ‘finance discipline’, Keynesian, Minskyan, and other 
such theories are handicapped in the market for academic and professional ideas by 
their positive realism rather than the norms that they offer for successful 
speculation. (I would like to think that this is the reason why Paul Davidson and I 
are not on Wall Street payrolls.) Despite Merton’s puff about ‘scientific empirical 
examination’, modern finance is normative in purpose and assumption, and has 
been interpreted as such by fund managers in its main markets in the US and UK. 
Markowitz’ portfolio theory was the first major red herring, postulating a 
universal calculus to obtain optimally diversified portfolios with spreads of returns 
depending upon the extent to which investors were willing to hold risky assets. It 
was but a small step to impose a determinate frequency distribution for future 
returns and divide those returns into a market average and a stock-specific return. 
Thus was born the Capital Asset Pricing Model that is the staple of the modern 
finance textbook. 
But the red herring that drew most academic hounds and spawned the most 
important subsequent red herrings was the Modigliani–Miller ‘theorem’. Most 
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readers of finance textbooks know this as ‘proving’ that the value of a company is 
independent of its financing. In fact, the theory shows that in a state of perfect 
competition and knowledge of future returns, financing does not affect the value of 
a company. Merton Miller’s especial contribution to the theorem was not only the 
observation that there was a wide dispersion of financing among American 
companies, but also a very convenient definition of equilibrium in which no further 
arbitrage was possible. The theorem was most widely interpreted as demonstrating 
that any non-random distribution of financing among companies must be due to 
departures from the initial restrictive assumptions about perfect competition, 
knowledge and so on. This set finance and economics off on a hunt for ‘market 
imperfections’ that may account for non-random financing. 
An immediate consequence of this line of reasoning was that corporate 
finance, or the study of how companies actually finance their activities, and the 
effects of that financing on their activities, disappeared from the discussion. 
Furthermore, with the assumption of ‘no arbitrage’, the investigation of actual 
financial market processes was reduced to connecting prices to ‘information’. All 
that was now necessary to understand markets was time series analysis of price 
data. Far from extending the boundaries of our knowledge, finance was now 
excluding key aspects of financial activity from the scope of its analysis. 
The search for ‘market imperfections’ led to other theoretical innovations 
that further narrowed the ‘scientific’ and policy discourse of finance. Predictably 
Chicago identified taxation and market regulation as the culprits in financial market 
inefficiency. In response, Joseph Stiglitz at MIT offered information asymmetries 
as causing financial market imperfections. At Yale, Robert Shiller offered 
behavioural finance (not mentioned in this volume), and the failure of investors to 
calculate optimally, as explanations of market inefficiency. By the end of the 
twentieth century, the key expenditure decisions of firms that determine the 
dynamics of market economies, and the crucial influence of financing conditions 
upon those decisions, had been dropped off the agenda of academic finance. Their 
residual trace on that agenda was Tobin’s ‘q’ theory, relating the cost of investment 
to the cost of capital. But this was hardly seminal and, in its general equilibrium 
form, is relatively trivial. 
The first part of this book discusses some of the theories pre-dating the 
quantitative revolution. Here Morgen Witzel examines the financial management 
ideas of Jeremiah Jenks, Edward Meade and William Ripley; Geoffrey Poitras 
introduces us to the ideas of Frederick Macaulay and Frank Redington; and Gabriel 
Hawawini and Ashok Vora discuss how the calculation of yields evolved from the 
seventeenth century onwards. In this part too, Robert Dimand contributes an excellent 
survey of Irving Fisher’s contributions to finance theory, curiously omitting Fisher’s 
debt deflation theory. However, for reasons not made clear, Keynes’ analysis is 
absent from this part of the volume. Keynes is discussed separately at the end of the 
volume in Davidson’s contribution. This is possibly more logical, because Davidson 
engages so extensively and enthusiastically in polemics against the general 
equilibrium foundations of quantitative finance theory. Keynes’ appearance as an 
afterthought like this may also be connected with the concentration in this volume, in 
contrast to volume 1, on developments in American finance theory. 
Among the papers published here, ‘The history of quantitative risk 
measurement’ by Elton McGoun invites special mention because of its scholarly 
explanation of how, in the course of the quantitative revolution, uncertainty became 
conflated with calculable risk, and that calculable risk was then restricted to 
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tractable frequency distributions into which historical price data could be more 
easily fitted. The ‘results’ of analysis came to dominate realism: ‘… anything that 
is “extremely difficult” is “avoided” as “hardly affecting the results”’ (p. 207). 
McGoun provides a clear account of how, under such a regime of ‘theoretical 
rigour’, redefining terms allowed financial economists to persuade themselves that 
they were calculating the incalculable. 
In the final analysis it is not possible to see where finance went wrong, or 
how it was reduced to providing sedative comfort for practitioners facing the 
usual unprecedented uncertainty in the financial markets (see Toporowski 2002), 
without an overview of the history of the discipline, such as this volume and its 
companion, provide. In any discipline, individual papers and works invite 
criticism of their assumptions and/or their theoretical or methodological 
consistency. Only a survey of their history can give a clear indication of where an 
applied discipline such as finance has taken a wrong direction, or disengaged 
from the issues of our time, and the consequences of that disengagement. This is 
the main achievement of this volume and its editor Geoffrey Poitras (with 
assistance from Franck Jovanovic). 
My only overall reservation about this book is that it tends to accept the 
Merton line that the emergence of quantitative finance has been a purely academic 
process of ‘discovery’. This is very apparent in the middle part of this volume 
entitled ‘The Modern Finance Revolution: The Inside Perspective’, and in the final 
part entitled ‘Alternative Perspectives on the Revolution’. In the first of these 
sections Hal Varian, Rene Stultz, Robert Jarrow, Robert Merton and Myron 
Scholes pay glowing tributes to the intellectual profundity and originality of 
Markowitz, Miller, Merton, Sharpe, Black and Scholes. In the third and final part, 
Franck Jovanovic, Donald MacKenzie, Elton McGoun, and Paul Davidson question 
the assumptions that underlie quantitative finance. This presents finance as an 
academic hermeneutic, finding and criticising scholarly antecedents, and thrilling at 
or belittling originality. But behind these discussions was the depression into which 
the stock of investment bankers had fallen in the 1930s (see Sweezy 1941), and the 
recovery in that stock with the process of inflation in the US financial markets from 
the 1970s onwards, to the point where it is now impossible to read John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s classic, The Great Crash, sensibly without choking on déjà vu at the 
chapter entitled ‘In Goldman Sachs We Trust’. 
The emergence of quantitative finance was associated with the rise to 
financial market pre-eminence of fund managers deploying huge investments in 
increasingly unstable securities markets. The previous system of stabilising 
portfolios by holding government securities was losing its effectiveness, with the 
repayment of War debts, large capital issues by corporations, and a corresponding 
need to rebalance portfolios in favour of private sector liabilities. The theoretical 
innovations of Markowitz et al. offered a rationale for convincing fund managers 
that their portfolios were just as safe even as they were getting more risky. This 
background, mentioned only in passing in the editor’s introduction, would naturally 
suggest a consideration of the macroeconomic consequences of finance, and the 
apparent inability of financial economists to see beyond their price data analyses. 
However, since this volume was published when the current liquidity drain in the 
markets was a mere gurgle in the upper intestine of Wall Street, it is, perhaps, 
easier to overlook the absence of this consideration. Nevertheless it is the outcome 
of that financial inflation, and the abject failure of economists to provide a 
systematic account of it, that make this book so timely. Until economists and 
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policymakers emancipate themselves from mainstream finance theory, we cannot 
improve our failing financial system nor even start to create a scientific discipline 
of finance. 
 ________________________________ 
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